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Abstract
This paper aims to specify the meaning of gentrification in rapidly peri-urbanising metropolitan
regions in the context of Indonesia’s rapid transition to decentralisation and democracy. It dis-
cusses a case study of conflict over an environmental revitalisation project in a peri-urban area of
Bandung City. The analysis focuses on the political processes, tactics and strategies supporting
and opposing peri-urban gentrification and their consequences. The analysis illustrates how these
political dynamics mediate the interaction between the movement of capital and the spatial reor-
ganisation of social classes. It is argued that in the context of a peri-urbanising metropolis, gentrifi-
cation needs to be narrated less in terms of class-based neighbourhood succession and more in
terms of competing cross-class coalitions emerging at local and regional levels.
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Introduction
This paper will respond to the shortcomings
in the current gentrification literature, which
has to a large extent originated from
Western inner city cases (see for examples:
Ley, 1996; Smith, 1996), and assess its
potential application to peri-urban area or
the rural–urban transitional zone in develop-
ing non-Western countries. Learning from
Corresponding author:
Delik Hudalah, School of Architecture, Planning and Policy
Development, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Labtek IXA
PWK ITB Jl, Ganeca 10, Bandung 40132, Indonesia.
Email: d.hudalah@sappk.itb.ac.id
 at University of Groningen on January 13, 2015usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
an Indonesian case study, the paper will par-
ticularly focus on the roles of actors and
coalitions and their strategies in determining
the outcome of gentrification in a peri-urban
area.
Studies of Indonesian gentrification have
long been concerned with capitalist accumu-
lation of wealth manifested in market or
middle-class-driven urban land transforma-
tion and its social implications in the form of
marginalisation, eviction or displacement of
the poor or indigenous people for the sake of
increased spatial amenity, to name but a few
of the issues discussed (Bunnell et al., 2006;
Kusno, 2011; Peters, 2010, 2013; Winarso,
1999; Winayanti and Lang, 2004). Little
attention has been paid to the institutional
and political processes underlying this gentri-
fication. Meanwhile, as Lees (2012: 163) has
argued, gentrification needs to be regarded
as a plural phenomenon that is ‘embedded in
the soil and institutions’ of a country. In
other words, the outcomes of sociopolitical
interactions and conflicts among local actors
shape the direction of and resistance to gen-
trification (Shin, 2009).
Our case study is centred on a revitalisa-
tion project driven by the development of a
luxurious residential enclave in Punclut, an
ex-plantation peri-urban area of Bandung
City. Conflict in this case has to be viewed
in the context of a period of rapid institu-
tional transition in Indonesia, from a long-
established authoritarian government
towards Otonomi Daerah (Indonesia’s decen-
tralisation) and democracy from the early
2000s. It is a period where local governments
have shifted their behaviour from acting like
bawahan (subordinates of central govern-
ment) to raja kecil (little kings), thereby try-
ing to maximise their use of newly
transferred authority (Firman, 2009).
The next section attempts to locate the
gentrification literature within the context of
fast-growing, peri-urbanising Asian metro-
polis. Following a geographical and
historical overview of the case study, the
main tactics and strategies in the peri-urban
revitalisation project under investigation are
identified. The analytical focus is on the
aspects of conflict and the institutional fac-
tors pointed out above. We will show that in
this peri-urban case study, the relationship
between the inflow of capital and neighbour-
hood reinvestment is far more complex than
a supply–demand mechanism would suggest.
We will argue that the transformation of the
rent gap into reinvestment opportunities in
the peri-urban area is not autonomous but
intermediated by what Clark (1995: 1490)
called ‘social relations and power struggles’
among competing cross-class coalitions play-
ing at a regional scale.
Locating the gentrification
literature in the context of peri-
urbanising Asian metropolis
Gentrification can be broadly defined as a
socioeconomic process accompanying any
land use change from low to relatively high
functional value. From a structuralist view-
point, the process is often typified by the
replacement of indigenous and working-
class people in a decaying neighbourhood by
those of considerably higher socioeconomic
status (Glass, 1964). In the later stages of its
conceptual development, the process also
includes reinvestment of space neglected by
the market to generate profit (Clark, 2005).
In the latter, gentrification is no longer sim-
ply referred to as a systematic replacement
of the existing lower classes by higher ones,
but as being linked to the movement of capi-
tal underlying this commodification (Smith,
1986).
Gentrification, as a for-profit activity, has
been associated with a frontier on which
large-scale land and property investment,
development and speculation tend to be initi-
ated (Smith, 1996). In the developed world
the gentrification frontier has often been
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found in inner city areas (Ley, 1996; Smith,
1996). Neighbourhoods in the inner regions
of established, deindustrialising cities would
experience devalorisation. In turn, shifting
market demands, changing locational advan-
tages and the altering behaviour of land-
owners could create a substantial ‘rent gap’
(Whitehead, 2008). The rent gap is the value
disparity between potential and actual ‘high-
est and best’ land use (see Smith, 1979). It
represents the dynamics of opportunity for
reinvestment in decaying neighbourhoods.
Clearly, the rent gap is here seen as a ‘tem-
poral’ rather than a ‘spatial’ phenomenon.
As such, the gentrification frontier should
not be seen as an exclusive attribute of the
inner city. Instead, the phenomenon can also
be found in other types of location, includ-
ing, for instance, rural areas (see for exam-
ples: Darling, 2005; Phillips, 1993; Smith and
Higley, 2012).
According to Phillips (2004), the literature
relating to Western cities has so far main-
tained an empirical dichotomy between
‘urban’ and ‘rural’ gentrification. Our argu-
ment in this paper is that this tendency to
separate urban from rural space causes diffi-
culties when we attempt to uncover the gen-
eric issues defining gentrification – such as
revitalisation, reinvestment, inequality,
accessibility and displacement – in the con-
text of emerging and fast-growing Asian
metropolitan regions. Rimmer and Dick
(2009) have observed that Southeast Asian
metropolises historically have both an inner
frontier (the city core) and an outer frontier
(the outskirts of the city). In recent decades,
large-scale spatial expansion, including eco-
nomic restructuring and social transforma-
tion, has tended to occur not just in inner
city areas but also in this outer frontier
around large cities – the peri-urban area or
the urban-rural transitional zone (Bunnell
and Nah, 2004; Bunnell et al., 2010;
Hudalah et al., 2007; McGee, 1991; Webster,
2002, 2011). In South Asia, for instance,
privately owned special economic zones
(SEZs) are built at the peripheries of
medium-sized cities with direct connections
to the main cities (Levien, 2011). These are
not zones that the gentrification literature
has tended to focus on, to date.
As metropolitan spatial dynamics decon-
centrate towards the peri-urban areas, the
gentrification frontier in non-Western cities
will not be found exclusively in the inner
city. A considerable expanse of lower socio-
economic level neighbourhoods can be
found in such peripheral areas, which are
larger than the inner city. According to the
rent gap theory, they also have the potential
to be succeeded by higher-income house-
holds through the process of population dis-
placement and replacement (Gonen, 2004;
Ortega, 2012). Therefore, in line with
Phillips (2004), throughout the analysis we
seek ways to extend the gentrification lens
so that it is more open towards processes
occurring in the peri-urban area of a fast-
growing Indonesian metropolis.
The case study of Punclut, North
Bandung Area (KBU)
In the Sundanese language, Punclut literally
means ‘peak’. Geographically, it is associ-
ated with a hill and its lower surroundings,
located around 10 km to the north of the city
centre of Bandung, West Java Province.1
Currently, Punclut is divided into two differ-
ent local administrations: (1) the high
ground belongs to Bandung Barat District/
Kabupaten (582 ha), and (2) the low belongs
to Bandung Municipality/Kota (268 ha)2
(Figure 1). Our analysis focused on the lat-
ter, which is entirely part of the municipality.
Since the 1980s, this part of the peri-urban
area has transformed into one of Kota
Bandung’s most important recreational
parks and tourist attractions.
Punclut has experienced land develop-
ment conflicts for decades. As in other
Hudalah et al. 3
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Asian metropolitan regions, stories sur-
rounding peri-urban land use conflicts often
date back to colonial times (see for example
Bunnell et al., 2010). During the late Dutch
colonial era in the 1930s, Punclut mainly
consisted of a tea plantation owned by a
Dutch private company holding a long lease
(Moeliono, 2011). Following the nationalisa-
tion of Dutch assets in the early indepen-
dence era of the 1950s, the land tenure and
the future orientation of Punclut became
uncertain. First, the government claimed
state ownership over the land in Punclut. In
1961 the government granted titles of owner-
ship on the land to former army officers
who served during the 1940s war of
independence. Owing to various obstacles,
including a lack of infrastructure, none of
the military officers developed houses or set-
tlements in Punclut (Moeliono, 2011).
At the same time, the tea plantation was
gradually cleared by former plantation
workers, who claimed ownership of the land
in Punclut. They established scattered kam-
pongs (informal/irregular village settle-
ments) and low productive agricultural
fields on which rotating cultivation was
practised (Figure 2). Until recently, the
orang kampongs (the villagers) were still pre-
dominantly the former plantation workers
who had lived in these kampongs for gen-
erations. Owing to their long period of
Figure 1. Map of the North Bandung Area (KBU) indicating the location of the garden house project in
Punclut.
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occupation on these ex-plantations, the
former workers have been regarded as
pituin Punclut, the Sundanese expression
for the indigenous people of Punclut. In
2000 they numbered almost 12,000
(Pemerintah Kota Bandung, 2004a). Many
are poor and most residents work irregu-
larly. Most men rely on work in construc-
tion as their primary source of income.
Many members of households (both men
and women) generate subsidiary income
from seasonal farming.
Punclut is part of the Kawasan Bandung
Utara (KBU)3 or North Bandung Area, the
main upland area located in northern
Bandung Raya or the Bandung Metropolitan
Area (BMA) – the third largest metropolitan
region in Indonesia. KBU is effectively gov-
erned by at least four autonomous local gov-
ernments: Kabupaten Bandung Barat,
Kabupaten Bandung, Kota Bandung and
Kota Cimahi (Figure 3). With a total area of
38,548.33 ha, KBU mainly consists of pla-
teaus and hills surrounded by mountains. Its
lower areas are delimited by the 750 m con-
tour line.
The peri-urban areas of Indonesia’s large
cities, including conservation areas such as
Punclut, have become prime locations for
new private towns, villas and luxurious hous-
ing developments (Dick and Rimmer, 1998).
Since the early 1980s, Punclut has been popu-
lar among middle- and upper-income groups
because of its beautiful landscape, good local
climate, fresh air and proximity to Bandung
City at the core of the BMA. These physical
and spatial advantages have fostered uncon-
trolled land speculation and the developmentFigure 2. A scattered kampong in Punclut.
Figure 3. A three-dimensional map of Bandung Raya (BMA).
Source: modified with permission from DPKLTS (2005).
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of settlements and recreational facilities for
upper-class society.
Furthermore, land speculation and uncon-
trolled issuance of development permits in
Punclut, as in central urban areas (Peters,
2013), was triggered by central government’s
market-led development policies in the 1980s
and early 1990s. The most fundamental pol-
icy was the 1993 Deregulation Measures
Package (known as PAKTO 1993), which
allowed private developers to obtain permits-
in-principle (ijin prinsip) and site permits (ijin
lokasi) on privately owned land in Punclut
directly from central government through the
Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)
and the National Land Agency (BPN),
respectively (Moeliono, 2011). Accordingly,
affected lower government tiers, namely
West Java Provincial Government, Bandung
District Government and Bandung
Municipal Government, were required to
observe decisions made by the central gov-
ernment. While the central and provincial
government’s monitoring and control are too
remote to reach the peri-urban area, local
government is too ineffective to be aware of
the regional consequences of their decisions.
This institutional ‘gap’ has resulted in an
uncontrolled amount and area of land being
acquired in Punclut. During the ‘boom
period’ of the 1990s, land controlled by pri-
vate developers increased dramatically from
586 ha in 1992 to 2832 ha in 1996
(Natalivan, 2004) in the outer district of
North Bandung Area (KBU) – including
Punclut. Bandung Municipal Government
recorded that after the property boom of the
early 1990s, more than 40% of the land in
Punclut under Kota Bandung was controlled
by only three private residential developers
(Pemerintah Kota Bandung, 2004a).
After a decade of land acquisition, devel-
opment had commenced in only a small frac-
tion of the land parcels owned by PT DAM
Utama Sakti, which was the largest of the
three upper-income housing developers
operating in Punclut. Until the early 2000s,
most of these land parcels were still mainly
used by the indigenous people for seasonal
farming. In their report, the municipal gov-
ernment argued that such unexecuted land
development permits had largely contributed
to an increase in erosion, sedimentation and
air temperature, the lowering of the ground-
water level, and a decrease in vegetation
(Pemerintah Kota Bandung, 2004a). The
report argued that reduced vegetation caused
by the land development had increased the
magnitude and occurrence of floods during
the rainy season, especially around the city
and the lower parts of the region.
The environmental revitalisation project
In 2004 the municipal government, backed
by PT DAM Utama Sakti, the largest pri-
vate developer in Punclut, proposed an
empowerment of the economic potential of
Punclut as a residential and agri-tourism
area. The ultimate aim of this public–private
partnership project was to revitalise
Punclut’s ecological function as a buffer
zone for urban expansion, which had dete-
riorated over the previous ten years because
of uncontrolled informal and formal resi-
dential development.
According to the environmental revitali-
sation planning report, two interrelated
urban development concepts have motivated
the project (Pemerintah Kota Bandung,
2004a). The first was land consolidation and
titling, which would provide the existing
marginalised villagers with a legal basis to
continue cultivating the land they occupied.
The concept was initially expected to
increase the indigenous people’s sense of
belonging to the land, thus ensuring the sus-
tainability of the greening programme.
The second and most important concept
was integrated tourism development, which
tried to combine agri-tourism and ecological
functions with residential development. The
6 Urban Studies
 at University of Groningen on January 13, 2015usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
latter could be viewed as the government’s
strategy to accommodate the delivery of a
luxurious residential enclave proposed by
the developer. The concept adopted the
developers’ idea of rumah kebun (garden
houses) (Dam Utama Sakti, 2005). The con-
cept referred to low-density luxurious houses
(with at most 20% building coverage ratio)




Our analysis will focus on the strategies for
and against the peri-urban environmental
revitalisation project in Punclut and its con-
sequences. As such, our analytical frame-
work for gentrification shifts from merely
the market process of land reallocation and
supply–demand mechanisms towards spatial
contestation. Gentrification is viewed here
as a socio-spatial struggle among contending
stakeholders vying for control over a con-
tested space (Betancur, 2002; Shin, 2009). As
Smith (1986: 34) has argued, frontier devel-
opment is ‘more directly political rather than
economic’. Following Clark (2005), we pay
particular attention to the emergence, devel-
opment and outcomes of polarising coali-
tions struggling for dominance over the
peri-urban environmental revitalisation proj-
ect in Punclut.
To this end, in 2008 we conducted semi-
structured private and group interviews with
15 key informants from municipal adminis-
trators, members of the local council, politi-
cians, planning consultants, academics,
researchers and informal community lead-
ers, including heads of neighbourhood asso-
ciations, who had directly participated in
promoting or opposing the revitalisation
project. The main researcher acted not just
as a passive interviewer but also as a close
observer of the conflict for around six
months, during which he followed relevant
discussions and meetings. The information
resulting from the interviews was analysed
using qualitative coding techniques and was
combined with other supporting data, such
as field observation and a content analysis
of official documents, minutes of meetings
and articles in popular newspapers.
Introduction to key actors surrounding the
revitalisation project
Before analysing their strategies, it is impor-
tant to introduce the key actors who sup-
ported and opposed the environmental
revitalisation project in Punclut. One of the
proponents of the revitalisation project was
the Bandung Municipal Government which,
since the implementation of Law No. 22 of
1999 (later replaced by Law No. 32 of 2004)
on decentralised regional administration,
has been conditioned to increase its reliance
on local revenue through local taxes, levies
and fees in executing its governmental func-
tions. In the decentralisation era, these
locally generated revenues contributed
around 70% of all local government reven-
ues (Mardiasmo, 2009 in Firman, 2013). As
an illustration, during the period 1997–2006,
the local revenues of Bandung Municipal
Government increased from only 68 billion
rupiahs to more than 343 billion (calculated
Figure 4. A garden house under construction.
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from Reerink, 2011). In 2006 this municipal-
ity’s land and building taxes and develop-
ment permit fees constituted almost one
third of its total revenues, with the rest com-
ing from other kinds of local taxes, levies
and fees.
Under this pressure to increase local rev-
enues, the municipal government was forced
to adapt their land use plans to this private
initiative. In an interview on 27 September
2008, a top official from the Bandung
Municipal Development Planning Agency
argued for a revision of the local land use
plan to accommodate the garden house proj-
ect in Punclut:
So, the government as a facilitator, considering
such interests from the perspective of society
[the developer] and investment obstacles in
Bandung City, including [due to the rigidity of]
rules in [the actual] RTRW [the land use plan],
wished to revise RTRW. RTRW is essentially
a commitment to stakeholders . If some of
those stakeholders request revisions, we can
negotiate about it.
The land use revision proposed by the munic-
ipal executive agency had to be approved by
the local council of Bandung Municipality.
The local council active during the Punclut
conflict analysed in this article was formed
after the 2004 legislative election. This was
the second democratic election since the
beginning of the reform era in 1998. Each
winning party or a coalition of smaller par-
ties formed a political group in the assembly.
Since the beginning of the conflict, the politi-
cal groups had been divided into the ruling
majority who fought for the environmental
revitalisation project proposal and the
opposing minority who countered it.
The decentralisation policy encouraged
both the municipal government and the rul-
ing groups in the local council to behave as
what Firman (2009) termed ‘raja kecil’ or lit-
tle kings, who selfishly managed their own
city without any substantial coordination
with their neighbouring districts and munici-
palities and the provincial government. In
Punclut the pressure from the ruling groups
to increase revenues particularly undermined
the 1982 Governor’s Decree and a number
of provincial land use plans for the conserva-
tion of northern BMA, as the region’s main
water catchment area (Pemerintah Kota
Bandung, 2004b).
Backing the municipal revitalisation pro-
posal, PT DAM Utama Sakti, which was the
largest of the three developers operating in
Punclut, had previously initiated a large-
scale urban transformation in the form of
rumah kebun (‘garden houses’), which would
become exclusive, luxurious low-density
houses and recreational areas complete with
road networks. It had become a sign of pres-
tige for this upper-income housing developer
to own a project in Punclut – as part of the
KBU. There is an assumption among such
developers that ‘if a developer has not been
able to build in KBU, it seems that he can-
not be called taipan . not a great one’
(interview with a planning consultant on 1
September 2008). Taipan is a nickname for
rich and successful Indonesian businessmen
– mostly of Chinese origin. Because of the
strict planning regulatory framework in the
KBU, for most taipans, succeeding in build-
ing houses and facilities in the KBU also
meant succeeding in breaking the law. In
fact, it has become a seemingly unavoidable
practice among the local and provincial gov-
ernments and developers wishing to build in
KBU (Reerink, 2011). As an illustration, a
planner admitted:
A friend of mine [working] in a [local govern-
ment] institution asked [consulted with me]
about a rich person [developer] who wanted to
invest in apartments or a mall, preferably in
the KBU. In short, he wanted to hire me. [He
said] ‘you have so far been planning the KBU
so you know the loopholes in Punclut [KBU]’.
(interview with the same planner as above on
1 September 2008)
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This informant’s statement confirmed the
findings of other scholars who have shown
that the land development practices in
Indonesia have been characterised by discre-
tionary, clientelist and corrupt practices,
partly because of the strong influence of the
market and the private sector (Server, 1996;
Winarso and Firman, 2002).
Following the democratisation policies of
the reform era, NGOs grew dramatically
both in number and size and have gained an
increasing influence in the government’s
decision-making process. Several leading
environmental NGOs in the metropolitan
region, such as Dewan Pemerhati Kehutanan
Lingkungan Tatar Sunda (DPKLTS) or the
Research Council for Sundanese Forest and
Environmental Conservation, originated
from within society. Meanwhile, several
national NGOs operating in the region, espe-
cially Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia
(Walhi) or Forum for Indonesia’s
Environment enjoyed strong grassroots sup-
port and a relatively independent political
position. Therefore, they consistently fought
against the environmental revitalisation proj-
ect from its outset. They argued that the proj-
ect’s idea of promoting partnership with
private housing developers had failed to fulfil
the government’s earlier commitments to pro-
mote local community participation.
Furthermore, Punclut’s urban environ-
mental role has been considered very impor-
tant to the opposition faction of the local
council because it included the largest surviv-
ing green space near the city. They argued
that the quality of the environment around
Punclut served as the planners’ figurative
battle frontier, symbolising the critical per-
formance of peri-urban land use planning in
KBU as a whole. A group interview with the
opposition group in the local council clearly
illustrates this point: ‘One of our fortresses
was Punclut. If it is penetrated [by an initiat-
ing developer], northern Ujung Berung and
other parts of Bandung’s high ground will
also be penetrated .’ (group interview with
the head and members of the local council’s
opposition group, 9 September 2008). The
opposition group believed that the failure to
restrain peri-urban transformation in
Punclut would become a precedent for devel-
opers to transform other parts of the pro-
tected green space in KBU located farther
from the city or in kabupatens, into new
urban functions with higher land use value.
The pro-growth strategies
Punclut entered a new episode of public
debate from the early 1990s onwards.
During this period, a number of land devel-
opment permits were issued for locations
that had earlier been designated as protected
water catchment areas in the regional and
local land use plans discussed above.
However, the local development planning
agency had never discussed these legal viola-
tions until 2003, when large sections of the
land were controlled by a number of housing
developers. For the planning agency, the
issuance of the development permits them-
selves was not an issue. Instead, they dis-
cussed how to arrive at a compromise in the
local land use plan so that controlled urban
land development could still be allowed.
According to the planning agency, which
was later reinforced by the local council’s
ruling groups, the local land use plan was
considered too idealistic and detached from
reality. The planning agency commented
that the plan was ‘less rational and less
dynamic than the city’s inherent develop-
ment potential and the acceleration of the
economic and physical growth of the city’
(interview with a former official from the
local development planning agency, 27
September 2008).
The government–developers coalition
promoted a ‘planning is development’ con-
cept in which it was not the development
that should conform to the plan but the plan
Hudalah et al. 9
 at University of Groningen on January 13, 2015usj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
itself that should be adaptable to market
demands. Given the limited fiscal transfer
from the national government to local
authorities following the 1999 fiscal decen-
tralisation policies, the government and the
ruling political groups had agreed that they
needed to build coalitions with private hous-
ing developers to preserve the quality of the
environment around the city. Consequently,
the land use plan contained minimised, flex-
ible and adaptive rules, which have become
a foundation for neoliberal planning policy
and, as Smith (2002) argued, this was inevi-
tably required as an impulse of capitalist
production. This neoliberal argument pro-
vided the basis for the revision of the one-
year-old land use plan, which later became
an important legal justification for boosting
the privately led environmental revitalisation
project in Punclut.
In response to the claim that the project
might violate regional and national land use
plans and regulations, the municipal govern-
ment invited geologists to conduct a study.
The geologists concluded that Punclut was
not in fact a water recharge area since the
rocks beneath its soil are volcanic breccias,
in which water only infiltrates to a certain
depth and then flows downhill instead of
being retained within (interview with a for-
mer top official from the municipal planning
department on 27 September 2008).
Consequently, it was argued that increase of
vegetation would not significantly improve
the ability of Punclut’s soil to retain water
flows. Therefore, undermining the ecological
function of Punclut, the municipal govern-
ment tend to loosely treated it as a ‘pro-
tected’ area with more possibilities provided
for urban development, such as low-density
housing.
In line with the geologists’ analysis, the
villagers were supportive of the revitalisation
project to get what they wanted, through
strategically downplaying the ecological
function of the area. They argued that
‘Punclut did not retain the flow of water but
passed it downhill’ (interview with a commu-
nity leader on 24 October 2008). While
many planners blamed the hill for causing
floods and drought in the lowlands, the vil-
lagers countered by stating that the people
who genuinely ran out of clean water were
not the lowlanders but they themselves, who
had to obtain their supply from distant dis-
tricts. From the villagers’ perspective, the
issue of basic infrastructure and services in
the peri-urban area had long been margina-
lised in the municipal planning policies.
With the environmental revitalisation proj-
ect, the government, supported by the devel-
oper, for the first time promised to provide
the villagers with land tenure security and
build infrastructure including asphalt roads,
basic schools, healthcare facilities, clean run-
ning water and all the amenities that were
otherwise exclusively enjoyed by the people
in the city proper.
In another effort to support the under-
mined ecological function of Punclut, the vil-
lagers put forward a number of arguments
around land tenure history. They explained
that the Dutch Government had not planned
Punclut as a protected forest. It had always
been designated as a residential area for the
tea plantation workers, most of whom had
become the current villagers:
For us, green means beautiful. We also want
Punclut to become a green area but please
remember that becoming green doesn’t mean
forest, because we are not orang-utans .
because for the almost 60 years that I have
lived in Punclut, never has Punclut been a for-
est. (Interview with a community leader, 24
October 2008)
Supporting the revitalisation project, the
locals expected their aspiration to be adopted
by the government for the first time:
They [the NGOs] said [that] the people of
Punclut would become mere spectators. I said
10 Urban Studies
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yes we could only look on because the housing
estates . are beyond what these people can
earn. But as long as we are allowed to be spec-
tators, we cannot [be forced to] leave the land,
meaning that we will not be thrown off the
land. (Interview with the same community
leader, 24 October 2008)
This statement also shows that the villagers
actually realised that they would ultimately
be alienated by the growth coalition. They
observed that the primary business of the
developer was not greening or fostering local
participation but building about 170 luxur-
ious villas complete with amenities and an
expensive international elementary school
for incoming upper-class people. Meanwhile,
the elementary school intended for low-
income indigenous people had never been
realised. A wide connecting road was well
built, but it was also gated. Villagers and
other people from outside the ‘gated commu-
nity’ are not free to use the road and other
amenities. They have to pass through a tight
security check. Such restricted access has
become a common feature of security-based
gated residential development in socially seg-
regated Indonesian cities and suburbs
(Leisch, 2002; Prayoga and Esariti, 2011;
Rimmer and Dick, 2009). Clearly, the villa-
gers were not treated as allies but more like
pawns. In such state-sponsored gentrifica-
tion, support from the local community is
often required as a ‘political tool’ to justify
the realisation of a project (Lees, 2014).
The pro-environment strategies
In contrast to the growth coalition, planners
and environmental activists felt that improv-
ing the green character of Punclut was cru-
cial to ensuring the long-term performance
of the Bandung Great Basin as a water
catchment area. The decrease in the density
of plants and trees, as a consequence of the
residential development project, would
increase the frequency and magnitude of
floods in the city and the lowlands. The
increased magnitude of the disaster became
evident as soon as the project started.
Following the construction of the main
road, massive run-off downhill caused flood-
ing of the city’s main riverbanks, which had
never overflowed before (Kompas, 2005).
To urban environmental advocates,
because of its scale and geographical prox-
imity to the city, Punclut had become the
emblem of peri-urban planning performance
around the northern part of the city. As
such, what happened in Punclut would
determine the fate of other peri-urban areas.
They predicted that if the developer was
allowed to build high-income houses in
Punclut, others elsewhere and farther from
the city would follow. Therefore, regardless
of the fact that the land tenure remained
uncertain, the peri-urban area’s ecological
functions needed to be protected. Later, its
socioeconomic function as a tourism area
could enjoy the same support, ultimately fol-
lowed by socio-cultural improvement by
encouraging participation and providing the
villagers better legal rights to the land they
occupy.
This environmental argument was
strengthened by the minority group within
the local council. This political group pro-
posed Punclut as an integral part of KBU,
in order to promote the sustainability of the
region. Since the upland is shared by three
other kotas and kabupatens, Kota Bandung
could not decide alone about the peri-urban
transformation but it had to cooperate with
the neighbouring kota and kabupatens. In a
specific response to the government’s pro-
posal, the minority group commented that
urban development planning should be
implemented holistically and not just to pro-
mote the economy (interview with the oppo-
sition group of the local council on 9
September 2008). Peri-urban development
could be justified as long as it was based on
the vision of improving the quality of the
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environment. The political group suggested
that if the environment was improved, unne-
cessary socioeconomic costs such as pollu-
tion, floods and drought would be avoided.
As a result, broad-based popular prosperity,
which is the main goal of urban develop-
ment, would increase in the longer term.
The opposition group’s arguments were
reinforced by recommendations made by
urban planners and academics to keep
Punclut green in the local land use plan.
Green areas were designated to minimise
uncontrolled urban development, which
would harm the water catchment function
(interviews with faculty staff from Bandung
Institute of Technology on 29 August 2008).
As a counterargument to the land use plan
revision, the planners advocated that the
plan should not be misused merely to justify
the land development permits issued.
Instead, the plan should be able to anticipate
and contribute to shaping future trends in
urban development and provide interested
and participating stakeholders with legal
certainty.
The NGOs, environmental experts and
planners formed a policy coalition framed
by environmental arguments, which were
frequently linked to scientific observation
and local cultural knowledge such as leu-
weung – the Sundanese cultural concept of
green space. The arguments attempted to
raise awareness of the critical condition of
the environment and green space in Punclut
among society, policymakers and politicians.
They aimed to rediscover the meaning of
broad-based popular prosperity and quality
of urban life by revitalising the ecological
functions of Punclut and KBU as a whole.
Through dissemination of research, public
speeches, social networks and press releases,
and mass protests, the coalition’s broad
objectives attracted wider communities with
no direct interest in the environment to join
it. These newly participating communities
included the disabled, traditional merchants,
labourers, the urban poor, cultural observers
and artists.
The pro-environment strategies were ulti-
mately unable to force the growth coalition
to reconsider their environmental revitalisa-
tion project. Nevertheless, following lengthy
debate and conflict, urban environmental
sustainability became an important item on
the local political agenda for the first time.
Learning from the failure to prevent the pro-
growth project’s realisation, a powerful can-
didate used environmental issues as a major
theme during an election campaign for the
new mayoral post. Moreover, the conflict
had pushed the provincial government, as
another proponent of the pro-environment
coalition, to show a proactive commitment
to preserving KBU, which was considered as
the region’s main water catchment area and
was suffering from declining environmental
quality. Among other attempts, the provin-
cial government has prepared a law on land
utilisation control in KBU by involving
planners, experts and activists who actively
criticised the growth coalition’s policy dur-
ing the conflict over the revitalisation project
in Punclut.
Conclusion
Most of the gentrification literature from
the global North has focused on either the
inner city or the rural (see for example
Phillips, 2004). Transferred directly to
Indonesia, this conceptual divide loses its
fundamental sense. This is due to the fact
that the frontier of the circuits of capital in
this country is located not only in the inner
city but also in peri-urban areas, the transi-
tional space between urban and rural areas
in fast-growing metropolitan regions. This
paper, therefore, has sought to reveal a sup-
plementary understanding of gentrification
in the context of rapidly peri-urbanising
metropolitan areas in Indonesia, with a par-
ticular emphasis on northern BMA.
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Based on our case study of a low-density
housing development in Punclut, it can be
concluded that conflict over peri-urban
gentrification is essentially a struggle for a
‘no-man’s land’. In this context, the gentrifi-
cation proponents are represented by a
growth coalition of taipans (great private
developers) and raja kecils (decentralised
local governments). They seek not only
proximity to the city or wilderness amenities
(Darling, 2005) or lifestyle and cultural reor-
ientation (Phillips, 2004), but also maximum
flexibility of rules and institutional vacuum,
as can be found in the peri-urban areas of
large cities. Peri-urban areas are cross-
jurisdictional areas with unclear authority.
They are geographically located far from a
city centre, and thus seemingly unreachable
from the day-to-day planning policy discus-
sion and development control within either
kota (the urban government) or kabupaten
(the rural government).
It has been made evident elsewhere that
the negative impact of Asian peri-urban land
development in formerly populated rural
areas can take the form of the physical dis-
placement of poor farmers and settlers
(Ortega, 2012). By way of contrast, in our
case study of Punclut, physical displacement
of villagers was not an immediate feature of
peri-urban gentrification. Instead, peri-
urban gentrification entailed a legal erosion
of the local and regional communities’
access to the functional role of the peri-
urban area. As illustrated in the case study,
this legal erosion has been manifested in at
least two forms. First, there has been a coer-
cive dismantling of land rights of margina-
lised and low-income society. Although that
had not yet happened during the research
period, it seemed likely that this kind of dis-
possession would lay the foundations for
actual physical displacement of the local res-
idents. Another form of legal erosion could
be associated with the enforced revision of
the land use plan, which foresaw benefit
from the mere gentrification of the neigh-
bourhood while harming the sustainability
of the wider urban region.
This case also reveals that villagers (the
poor) are not always straightforwardly seen
as the predefined victim (subject) of gentrifi-
cation. As the country’s political system was
democratised, the government–capitalist
coalition at first pretended to be ‘populist’ to
gain wider support. For example, the growth
coalition promised to incorporate the nar-
row aspirations of the villagers, who wished
to have better access to land and basic infra-
structure, into their policy. The coalition
ultimately failed to fulfil many of their pro-
mises, for various reasons. The mobilisation
of villagers in this case, therefore, could not
be regarded as a community empowerment
strategy but rather, as Lees (2014) also
found, as manipulation, as a short-term
political tool to achieve the shared objectives
of gentrification’s proponents.
Moving to the peri-urban area, the social
and political conflicts surrounding gentrifica-
tion have shifted from the neighbourhood to
local and regional levels. The case study
shows in particular how the local growth
coalition, in implementing their gentrifica-
tion idea, had to confront strong resistance
emerging from the metropolitan level. The
contested policy issue was not just about
neighbourhood segregation but, more impor-
tantly, urban quality of life, regional frag-
mentation and environmental sustainability.
This case study shows that the relation-
ship between the movement of capital and
the spatial reorganisation of social classes is
far more complex than the structuralist’s
supply and demand mechanisms would sug-
gest. The interaction between these two basic
elements of gentrification can be rather indi-
rect, and sometimes needs to be mediated by
the dynamics of local, regional and national
institutional specificity. In the case of
Punclut, the absence of regional institutional
tiers resulting from the decentralisation
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policy has weakened the government’s
capacity to deal with influxes of capital in
the form of luxurious land and property
development. A weak regional government
structure has created considerable ‘institu-
tional gaps’. It was an institutional gap
rather than a rent gap that helped the hous-
ing developers to easily expand their influ-
ence in the peri-urban area. In turn, the
incoming middle-class residents attracted by
the developer systematically replaced the
role of the poor villagers and the former
middle classes (the planners, the environ-
mental advocates and the military officers)
in reshaping the protected peri-urban space.
As a result, in this peri-urbanising metropo-
lis, gentrification needs to be narrated less in
terms of class-based land use succession and,
as Shin (2013) suggested, more in terms of
the emergence of a cross-class coalition
shaped by the historical landscape of the
domestic political system.
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Notes
1. Located between Jakarta Capital Special
Province and Central Java, West Java is the
largest province in Indonesia. It is dominated
by the Sundanese, a distinct cultural and lin-
guistic group that is different from Javanese,
the dominant cultural and linguistic group in
Java and in Indonesia. The capital and the
largest city of West Java Province is
Bandung, which is located in the central
region, about 140 km from Jakarta.
2. Following the decentralisation policy, local
governments in Indonesia were divided into
municipal governments and district govern-
ments. Municipal government (pemerintah
kota) refers to urban government, which is
generally more institutionally capable to man-
age urbanisation than district government
(pemerintah kabupaten), which refers to rural
governments.
3. KBU has a unique ecological function
because of its topographic and geological
characteristics. A municipal planning report
(Pemerintah Kota Bandung, 2004b) noted
that KBU covers only 11% of the metropoli-
tan area but it is claimed that, because of its
soil, rock types and formation, it provides at
least 60% of the region’s groundwater needs.
A series of governor’s decrees have referred
to KBU as the region’s main water catchment
and conservation area. KBU was first men-
tioned in a Governor’s Decree of the West
Java Province in 1982 (No. 181.1/Sk.1624-
Bapp/1982) on the Conservation of the
Northern Part of BMA. As the main regula-
tory foundation, the Governor’s Decree
strove to preserve 25% of KBU as protected
forests and only allow 15% of KBU to be
converted into cultivation areas – most likely
new settlements. The governor’s decrees were
later reinforced by presidential decrees and a
number of provincial and national land use
plans.
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